Question 1. An MCP server sits in front of a third-party API. To keep the design simple, it accepts the access token sent by the MCP client and forwards it unchanged to the downstream API, without checking who the token was issued to. What should the security review conclude?
- Option A: The design is acceptable as long as the tokens are only ever sent over TLS between components
- Option B: The design is acceptable if the downstream API enforces rate limiting
- Option C: Reject it as token passthrough: MCP servers must not accept tokens not issued for them
- Option D: The server should store the client's token in the system prompt so the agent can reuse it
Show answer and explanation
Correct answer: C. Reject it as token passthrough: MCP servers must not accept tokens not issued for them
Token passthrough lets clients bypass controls that rely on the token audience, muddies the audit trail and breaks trust boundaries. The fix is audience validation: an MCP server only accepts tokens issued for itself and obtains its own tokens for downstream APIs.
- A (incorrect)TLS protects the token in transit, but does nothing about the server accepting tokens that were never issued to it.
- B (incorrect)Downstream controls that depend on the token audience are exactly what token passthrough can circumvent; it also breaks accountability at the MCP server.
- C (correct)Correct. The MCP security best practices call token passthrough an anti-pattern and state that MCP servers MUST NOT accept tokens not explicitly issued for the MCP server.
- D (incorrect)Credentials should never be placed in prompts; this adds a leakage risk without addressing the audience problem.
Reference: Model Context Protocol: Security Best Practices (opens in a new tab)

